A Comparative Analysis of ‘Good Citizenship’: A Latent Class Analysis of Adolescents’ Citizenship Norms in 38 Countries

Abstract

Various authors have claimed that citizenship norms have changed dramatically in contemporary societies. Recent research has studied the implications of Russell Dalton’s argument that duty-based citizenship norms (emphasizing voting and obeying the law) are being replaced by engaged citizenship norms (emphasizing self-expressive and non-institutionalized forms of participation). In this article we use the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Survey (n=140,650) to ascertain the cross-national empirical validity of engaged and duty-based norms. By means of latent class analysis, we show that both of these citizenship norms are indeed adhered to by different groups of adolescents. We also show however that only half of the research population holds these two norms, while other more traditional norms are also identified. The findings confirm expectations that high-status respondents with low political trust are more likely to adhere to engaged norms, but the country-level findings contradict expectations: engaged norms are less prevalent in highly developed stable democracies, and this casts doubts on the hypothesis that new engaged citizenship norms are predominantly found in stable highly-developed democracies.

Keywords:
citizenship norms, ICCS 2009, latent class analysis, engaged citizenship, duty-based citizenship

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**Introduction**

There can be little doubt that the relationship between citizens and the political system has altered in a dramatic manner in recent decades. In the literature, however, there is a strong disagreement about how to understand these transformations and how to assess their likely consequences for the future stability of democratic systems. Some of the literature describes these changes as a reduced willingness to engage in politics and community life (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Other authors point to the fact that highly educated citizens and younger age cohorts are more strongly motivated by self-expressive values, and that they are less likely to adopt a deferential attitude toward those holding political power (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris, 1999). In an influential study on citizenship norms, Dalton (2008) claimed that contemporary democracies are witnessing a decline of duty-based forms of citizenship, in favor of a more intrinsically engaged citizenship concept. Engaged citizens, according to Dalton (2008: 81) are driven by self-expressive values, and while they are likely to engage in various forms of political participation, they tend to avoid elite-defined forms of engagement.

In the literature on changes in citizenship norms, the assumption is that the rise of new citizenship norms will alter the nature of democratic linkage mechanisms between citizens and the political system. Despite these strong claims about evolving value orientations among citizens, there has been little empirical research thus far about the kind of citizenship norms that are actually supported by citizens of contemporary democracies.

The aim of the current article is therefore to investigate the structure and determinants of citizenship norms using recent representative data from a large and diverse group of contemporary democracies. The analysis sheds new light on the main trend in the literature on political value change which explains the emergence of new citizenship norms by referring to broad social
changes, most notably the rise of average education levels in industrial countries and generational replacement (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). If this is the case, however, a comparable trend should be found in all highly developed countries with rising average education levels and high levels of economic development and therefore it is important to determine which groups of the population adhere to these new norms.

Our analysis is based on the results of the large scale (n=140,650) *International Civic and Citizenship Education Survey* (ICCS) that was conducted in 2009 in 38 countries (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon, 2011). This survey is well-suited to test theories of citizenship norms and values change because it includes an extensive battery of questions posed to adolescents regarding citizenship norms in a wide variety of national contexts. The focus on adolescents is analytically relevant because Dalton (2007) suggests that this age group drives generational values changes, and because young people are most likely to be affected by current development trends (Sherrod, 2008). Since research has shown that adolescents have already developed a coherent understanding of citizenship roles (van Deth, Abendschön, and Vollmar, 2011), the focus on this age group has an additional advantage that results cannot be driven by age differences in citizenship norms, but rather reflect a reliable comparative picture of citizenship norms among a well-defined segment of the population. These data are analyzed using latent class analysis, a technique that allows us to determine whether the distinct norms of engaged and duty-based citizenship are cross-nationally valid concepts. Further, we investigate which individual-level and country-level factors influence whether actors adhere to different citizenship norms, in order to ascertain the claim that especially in highly developed democratic systems duty-based citizenship norms are eroding.

In this article we first review the literature on current changes in citizenship norms and then present the data and the method used. After presenting the results of the latent class analysis, we
investigate the factors that influence one’s citizenship conception, and review how the findings challenge a number of expectations in the research literature. We close with some observations about what the emergence of ‘new’ citizenship norms imply for the relationship between citizens and the state.

Literature

The concept of citizenship norms is strongly rooted in the political culture literature’s emphasis on normative expectations about how citizens relate to the political system. In what Almond and Verba (1963) referred to as the ‘civic’ culture, citizens see themselves as participants in the decision-making process, but they are also loyal to the system and adhere to the decisions that have been made. In the ‘subject’ political culture, on the other hand, citizens see themselves not as participants but as subjects of the political system. The way in which citizens conceive of their own role and responsibilities within a political system is of crucial importance because these norms guide actual behavior of citizens (John, Fieldhouse, and Liu, 2011; Straughn and Andriot, 2011).

Scholars have proposed the emergence of a new kind of citizenship norm in recent years, described in somewhat different terms as ‘engaged’ (Dalton, 2008), ‘critical’ (Norris, 1999), ‘monitorial’ (Schudson, 1998), and ‘self-actualizing’ (Bennett, 2012). The specifics of the citizenship norms described by these and other authors vary in some ways, but there is a general agreement among these scholars that citizens who do not highly value traditional duty-based norms may in fact be normatively engaged as ‘good citizens’ by highly valuing other aspects of democratic citizenship. Further, the emergence of these kinds of new citizenship norms is expected to have implications on citizens’ participatory behaviors, such as the emergence of ‘everyday makers’ who include forms of lifestyle activism in their participation repertoire (Li and Marsh,
‘standby citizens’ who are ready to participate if need be (Ammå and Ekman, 2013), and new types of participation repertoires as citizens now make their own individual combination of participation acts (Hustinx et al., 2012; Kaase, 2010).

These newly emerging normative frameworks place high value on non-institutionalised forms of political participation and civic engagement, while simultaneously de-emphasizing institutionalized or electoral forms of participation. Scholars like Dalton and Norris propose that instead of being politically apathetic or disengaged, those who adhere to these new citizenship norms may be highly normatively engaged as citizens through the positive value they attribute to elite-challenging behavior, and the support they express for post-modern political issues like human rights and environmental protection. ‘Engaged’ or ‘critical’ citizens are thus expected to shy away from traditional electoral acts like voting, while they should have a much more positive attitude toward engagement beyond the electoral arena, like protecting the environment or working within their own community.

Among the most influential contributions to the wave of recent scholarship on trends in citizenship norms is Dalton’s (2007) argument that two opposing citizenship norms — described as ‘duty-based’ and ‘engaged’ — are expected to have a direct impact on patterns of political behavior in contemporary politics. Dalton’s (2007) argument challenged the claim of some authors (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Wattenberg, 2012) that norms of civic duty are weakening and that as a result the level of political participation is declining. Dalton’s empirical research identifies new norms of engaged citizenship, particularly among young age cohorts, which he sees as compensating for the decline in duty-based political participation and therefore allaying concerns about functioning of a democracy. While we do not wish to claim that Dalton’s concepts offer a more adequate vision
on these changes than the work of other authors, his work leads to a number of clear hypotheses that can be empirically tested.

The argument on behalf of ‘engaged citizenship’ states that the erosion of duty-based citizenship norms, and hence the decline in traditional forms of political participation, is only ‘half of the story’ (Dalton 2008: 83). Although Dalton’s empirical test of this claim is primarily based on the analysis of cross-sectional data from the US, his discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings is wide-ranging: ‘the norms of citizenship are vital to understanding the political behavior of the American public (...) My central premise is that the social and political modernization of the United States – and other advanced industrial democracies – over the past several decades has systematically altered the distribution of citizenship norms in significant ways.’

This bold statement about the cross-national validity of the engaged and duty-based citizenship norms is derived from Dalton’s (2008) study of cross-sectional data from the United States. Elsewhere, Dalton (2007: 138-160) conducted analyses using International Social Survey Programme data for a select group of the most established and affluent nations and reported similar findings. In a study that used the same survey and analytical technique to study a larger and more diverse group of countries, however, distinctive engaged and duty-based norms were not identified (Bolzendahl and Coffé, 2013: 69). While studies that use US data only (e.g., Copeland, 2014) have strengthened the validity of Dalton’s theoretical framework for the US, studies in other national contexts have not consistently replicated the engaged / duty-based distinction (e.g., Denters, Gabriel, and Torcal, 2007). Indeed, comprehensive reviews of the literature have noted that empirical research on citizenship norms in diverse national settings have been surprisingly scarce,
particularly outside of the liberal democracies in Europe and North America (Bennett, 2012: 30; van Deth, 2007)

Scholars’ interest in changing citizenship norms, particularly among contemporary youth, is largely motivated by the expected effect of citizenship norms on political behavior. Research has shown, for example, that if ‘civic duty’ is considered as less important in one’s concept of what constitutes a good citizen, this will have an adverse impact on the propensity to vote (Blais, 2006; Blais and Rubenson, 2013; Chareka and Sears, 2006). Empirical evidence also indicates that ‘engaged’ citizenship norms are positively associated with elite-challenging forms of political engagement (Welzel and Deutsch, 2012). Various cross-sectional empirical studies have used the argument of generational change to motivate their investigations of relationships between citizenship norms and political behavior (Bolzendahl and Coffé, 2013; Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier, 2010), and longitudinal studies have shown convincingly that the attitudes of adolescents and young citizens can predict how they will participate in political later in their life cycle (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009). Studies like these suggest that if opinions and beliefs about the proper role of a citizen change, this is likely to have an impact on the way citizens relate to the political system. In sum, we can indeed be quite confident that citizenship norms have a strong impact on (future) political behavior, which underscores the importance of comprehensively investigating whether empirically-identified adolescent norms indeed align with prevalent theories in the literature.

Engaged citizenship norms clearly should be seen as part of the broader concept of self-expressive values from the literature on modernization processes (Inglehart, 1997). Dalton (2008: 81) argued that the rise of engaged citizenship norms is a consequence of a large scale modernization process that leads to the spread of self-expressive values (Inglehart and Welzel,
A major component of this process is that citizens are less likely to follow established routines or see themselves as part of large structured institutions, but tend to emphasize their own personality and value patterns. These values, in turn, lead to the observation that ‘engaged citizens’ will be inclined to be more sensitive to postmodern issues like human rights and the environment, but they will also be less deferential to political authorities. Elite-defined forms of political participation, like party membership, are thus likely to become less popular among these groups. In line with the post-modernization theories, we expect that engaged citizenship norms will be more prevalent in countries that have higher levels of economic development and longer traditions of stable democracy. Actors with higher education levels or other indicators for a higher socio-economic status usually are associated more strongly with this form of engagement.

In sum, this review of the literature indicates that in order to more clearly understand the impact of the changing citizenship norms of contemporary young people on democratic life, it is necessary to empirically investigate these norms as a proper topic of investigation on its own. A number of questions remain open in the current debate. First of all, it has not yet been demonstrated that engaged and duty-based citizenship are indeed distinctive citizenship norms in contemporary democracies writ large. Using data on the United States, Dalton (2008: 81, 95) distinguishes both concepts based on a rotated principal component analysis, but it is obvious that some items (e.g. the importance of voting) show strong cross-loadings, and both norms also correlate very strongly (.43). Stronger evidence is therefore needed to substantiate the argument of distinctive ‘engaged’ and ‘duty-based’ citizenship norms in contemporary societies. Authors readily assume that, for example, those who consider party membership to be important do not have a critical outlook toward politics (Whiteley, 2011). This assumption, however, is yet to be empirically examined. Empirical research in fact shows that in terms of political behavior, at least in the Scandinavian
countries, party and trade union members are highly engaged in all kinds of political participation that are usually considered to be typical expressions of a more critical outlook toward the political system (Hooghe and Dejaeghere, 2007). Hence, the first research question of this article is whether these ideal types of engaged and duty-based citizenship norms can be identified and distinguished in a broad cross-national sample in contemporary democracies.

A second main question that remains open for debate is whether new citizenship norms like ‘engaged citizenship’ are indeed more likely to be prevalent among advantaged citizens in mature democracies with strong economies. Dalton’s (2008: 77) claim is that the influence of the social and political modernization process in the United States can be generalized to other advanced democracies. The concept of engaged citizenship departs from an Inglehart-inspired outlook, leading to the assumption that the rise of new citizenship norms is an almost automatic process of generational replacement in response to rising levels of welfare, education levels and political sophistication (Highton, 2009). This literature therefore tends to stress the demand side of political behavior: as citizens acquire a higher level of political sophistication and political self-efficacy, they will espouse a different outlook toward their own role in the political system. Different aspects of this question have been investigated in single-country studies on the US (Dalton, 2008) and Canada (Raney and Berdahl, 2009), and single-region studies on Scandinavian countries (Denters, Gabriel, and Mariano, 2007; Oser and Hooghe, 2013). A rigorous investigation of this theory, however, requires a strong comparative research design with a broad geographical scope. Hence, the second research question of this article is whether new kinds of engaged citizenship norms are indeed found more frequently in richer and more established democracies and among the social groups that are routinely associated with social change.
Our goal in this article is to address both research questions. Using latent class analysis, we first investigate whether the ‘engaged’ and ‘duty-based’ citizen norms can indeed be identified in a broad cross-national survey sample. Second, we examine the socio-demographic, attitudinal and country-level correlates of the identified citizenship types.

**Data and methods**

This study uses data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) 2009 which documents the civic attitudes of 140,650 14-year-old students in 38 countries. Respondents were sampled in school classes, in most countries by the educational authorities themselves, resulting in a high response rate and a high degree of representativeness for this age group. The central monitoring team of ICCS ensured comparable methods throughout the 38 countries and controlled cross-cultural measurement equivalence of the scales in the questionnaire (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon, 2011). While most of the countries are situated in Europe, the ICCS survey was also conducted in various countries in Asia and Latin America, thus allowing for a comprehensive cross-national analysis. As the only large scale comparative dataset that includes a wide array of questions to adolescents, the ICCS dataset allows us to expand upon previous research that mostly remained limited to adults in advanced democracies, and focused on behavioral intentions. These unique data on youth therefore allow the in-depth exploration of normative patterns among contemporary young people that are not possible to adequately uncover in a large nationally representative survey that is limited in its youth sample. As Flanagan (2013) has noted: teenagers and adolescents develop very distinct concepts of citizenship, and this dataset allows us to investigate these concepts.
Our main variables of interest are the citizenship norms that are expressed by the respondents in this survey. In the ICCS survey, respondents were presented with a list of twelve behaviors and asked to note how important these actions are for being a ‘good adult citizen’, as listed in Table 1. Although the ICCS survey was not developed in concert with the main survey projects that have been the primary data source for scholars of citizenship norms, the ICCS items overlap to a large extent with the items used by Dalton in the US Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy (CID) survey to construct the concepts of duty-based and engaged citizenship. The ICCS indicators cover most of the ‘broad principles’ identified by Dalton (2008: 78) as central to past definitions of citizenship (namely: participation, social order and solidarity). Some of the ICCS indicators are identical to items in the US CID survey, while others tap into closely related concepts. For example, the ICCS does not include the classic duty-based indicators of ‘serving on a jury’ or ‘reporting on a crime’ that are present in the US CID survey but are not fully applicable to minors, but it does include duty-based indicators like ‘showing respect for government representatives’. In sum, there is sufficient overlap in the US CID and ICCS items to expect that duty-based and engaged norms will be identified if they are robust theoretical and empirical constructs.

[Table 1 About Here]

It has to be acknowledged that this is purely a cross-sectional dataset, and therefore it does not allow us to draw any conclusions with regard to trends over time. Nevertheless, in most of the literature it is stated that the trend toward more engaged citizenship norms is driven by specific structural changes in society that are expected to have a particular impact on the citizenship norms of contemporary youth. Since research has shown that adolescent citizenship norms have a strong
effect on future participatory engagement (Quintelier and Hooghe, 2012), it indeed makes sense to consider adolescents as ‘citizens of the future’ (Hooghe, 2004). It is useful, therefore, to ascertain whether these relationships can be identified even in cross-sectional data.

The identification of a distinct group of adolescents who express an engaged citizenship norm would entail identifying a subgroup of the population which emphasizes the importance of non-institutionalized forms of political participation (such as supporting the environment, protecting human rights and protesting) while simultaneously placing less emphasis on the importance of institutionalized forms of participation (such as voting, party membership, respecting government officials). A duty-based group would be expected to have opposite emphases. This means that engaged and duty-based citizenship norms can be thought of as discrete categories or ‘ideal type’ citizens who are characterized by attributing relatively high importance to one set of indicators (e.g. human rights and environment) while simultaneously attributing relatively low importance to a competing set of indicators (e.g. voting and joining a party).

This theoretical interest of identifying whether these kinds of ‘ideal type’ citizenship norms indeed exist in the research population is precisely the sort of question for which latent class analysis (LCA) is well-suited (Collins and Lanza, 2010; Hagenaars and Halman, 1989; Oser, Hooghe and Marien, 2013). In recent years the common application of LCA as a probabilistic form of cluster analysis has become widely used in various fields in the social sciences. Latent class analysis is similar to the commonly-used technique of factor analysis in that it identifies latent variables on the basis of multiple empirical indicators. Although factor analysis has been used in this field of study to identify how variables group together into separate ‘dimensions of citizenship’ (Dalton 2008: 80-81), LCA can identify distinctive subgroups of the population that share common understandings of what constitutes good citizenship. Since the engaged citizenship norm is not
conceived of theoretically in the literature as a linear continuum or series of continua of indicators (as identified through factor analysis), but rather as a distinctive group of people who simultaneously score high on some measures (e.g. ‘engaged’ indicators) and low on others (e.g. ‘duty-based’ indicators), LCA is the most appropriate technique for determining whether this citizenship norm indeed exists in the research population.

On a technical level, model choice in LCA is informed by goodness-of-fit statistics like the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), making it preferable to standard cluster analysis in which the researcher must decide in a rather arbitrary manner on the optimal number of clusters. Once the preferred model has been identified, the likelihood of each latent class’s positive response on each indicator is estimated in terms of conditional probabilities. The modal probability of latent class membership can be estimated to identify respondents’ citizenship types. The LCA results therefore allow us to answer our first research question of whether distinct engaged and duty-based citizenship types can be identified.

In order to address the second research question of whether newer kinds of engaged citizenship norms are more prevalent among advantaged citizens in wealthy and established democracies, our next step is to use the results of the LCA to investigate the factors that influence the likelihood to belong to a particular type of citizenship norm (e.g. engaged or duty-based). Given that the dependent variable is a nominal variable, we estimate a multinomial multilevel model. Multilevel techniques are appropriate as individuals are nested in countries. Multilevel regression methods generate unbiased standard errors as they take into account the various dependencies (individuals in the same country tend to be more alike) and allow us to include variables at both the individual and country level (Hox, 2010).
Results

Citizenship Norms Identified Cross-nationally

The indicators of good citizenship used in this analysis, listed in Table 1, indicate that on average, adolescents tend to consider some elements more important than others. There is an almost universal consensus that obeying the law is important for good citizenship, but protecting the environment and human rights is also high on the priority list. Discussing politics, or joining a political party, on the other hand, are considered as important by less than half of the respondents.

The latent class analysis is based on these twelve indicators of good citizenship, with country as a covariate. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is the most widely used statistic for identifying optimal solutions, and a smaller BIC indicates better model fit. An additional approach that complements the BIC statistic is to assess the percent reduction of the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic $L^2$ in comparison to the one-LC model (Magidson and Vermunt 2004: 176-177). Even though the goodness of fit statistics in Table 2 show that the absolute value of the BIC still decreases up through the seven-LC model, there is relatively little improvement in the percentage reduction of the $L^2$ in the six-LC and seven-LC models. The seven-LC solution is clearly not preferable because of the small reduction in the $L^2$ and increased classification error. The substantive results of the five-LC and six-LC models were compared, showing that the six-LC solution identified a sixth group that lacked distinct normative emphases on the good citizenship indicators. Given these considerations, we opted for a five latent class solution.

[Table 2 About Here]
In sum, the preferred model for this analysis identifies five distinct latent classes that represent distinctive citizenship norms held by different groups of survey respondents. Two of these normative types correspond quite well to the expected normative emphases of engaged and duty-based citizens, as shown in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 About Here]

The group labeled ‘engaged’ (25 percent of the research population) is very likely to attribute importance to typically postmodern sensitivities like promoting human rights, protecting the environment and helping people in the community. At the same time, members of the engaged group have notably low probabilities for attributing importance to electoral and elite-defined activities such as voting and party membership. The analysis also identifies a ‘duty-based’ group (20 percent of the research population) whose preferences and priorities are often opposite to those of the engaged citizens. This group attributes relatively a low priority to promoting human rights and protecting the environment. Voting, on the other hand, is seen as important and this group is also characterized by the importance they give to political parties. Although these groups are fairly similar to each other on some indicators of good citizenship, their distinctively different normative emphases align with the two ideal types of citizens described by Dalton. Yet, these two groups together add up to only 45 percent of the research population.

Figure 2 presents the norms that are held by the remaining 55 percent of the research population. A small group (six percent) has relatively low probabilities of attributing importance to the variety of behaviors investigated in this research. In line with Almond and Verba (1963), these respondents could be called ’subjects’ given their relative emphasis on the importance of
obeying rather than actively participating. The group labeled ‘respectful citizens’ (18 percent of the research population) is characterized by a particularly high score on the item ‘it is important to show respect for government representatives’. Members of this group attribute relatively high importance to most other behaviors as well, but do not consider discussing politics to be an important component of good citizenship. Finally, the largest group of respondents (32 percent), which we describe as ‘all-around citizens’ believes that all possibilities offered are very important (with only the behavior of joining a political party obtaining a meaningfully lower score, but still well above the average of the whole sample). Additional data would be required to adjudicate between several possible interpretations regarding why this group has high scores on all items, including social desirability, genuinely high expectations about what a good citizen should do, or youthful lack of developed priorities regarding good citizenship. What is clear, however, is that all three of these groups, which together make up more than half of the research population, do not adhere to the normative profiles discussed most prominently in the literature of duty-based or engaged citizenship.

In sum, in relation to the first research question of this article, the findings confirm that the distinction introduced by Dalton in his analysis of US data is empirically valid in this cross-national analysis: the latent class analysis identifies two distinctive groups of engaged citizens and duty-based citizens that contrast strongly with regard to their priorities for good citizenship. It is noteworthy, however, that these two groups account for only 45 percent of all respondents. In other words, slightly more than half of all respondents in this international research project did not fit
the typology that has become prominent in the recent literature on citizenship norms. Indeed, it is important to note that more traditional citizenship concepts such as ‘respectful’ and ‘subject’ citizenship norms are identified even among adolescents.

*Individual and Country-level Determinants of Citizenship Norms*

The latent class analysis has shown that engaged and duty-based citizenship norms can be empirically distinguished. Based on the literature our expectation is that the engaged citizenship norm will be more prevalent among adolescents with a higher socio-economic status, and it is customary in research on adolescents to operationalize this characteristic by an estimation of the number of books at home. The same holds for those with higher levels of political sophistication, where we can rely on measures of respondents’ educational goals and level of political interest. Intensive media use is also included as a control variable because it is expected to contribute to political sophistication, particularly for the young age groups (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). Dalton (2008) expects that the engaged citizenship norm will be associated with lower levels of political trust, and with lower levels of political efficacy with regard to traditional political institutions. Engaged norms are expected to be more common among adolescent girls, who already highly value non-institutionalized forms of political participation, in comparison to boys of that age (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004). Finally, on the country level, the expectation is that these citizenship norms will be most prevalent in economically advanced countries with a longer tradition of stable democracy. In these countries it is expected that citizens develop more self-
expressive values and a more critical attitude toward political authorities (Welzel and Inglehart, 2005). Question wording and descriptive statistics can be found in appendix (Table A1).

The distribution across countries hint at the fact that the distribution of citizenship norms does not always respond to theoretical expectations (Appendix Table A2). While in the total sample, 25 percent of all respondents was assigned to engaged citizenship norms, the highest scores are in countries like Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, this citizenship norm is hardly found in Indonesia or the Dominican Republic. In the overall sample, 20 percent of all respondents was assigned to the duty-based citizenship concept. The highest scores for this form of citizenship concept, however, are recorded in advanced democracies like Switzerland and Denmark. Duty-based citizenship is hardly present in countries like Colombia, Guatemala and Taiwan.

These findings clarify that there are strong variations between countries, and therefore it is worthwhile to investigate the country-level factors determining citizenship norms. In line with the second research question, we investigate the factors that influence the likelihood to adhere to a particular citizenship type (i.e. engaged, duty-based, subject, respectful or all-around citizen) using a multinominal multilevel model, with duty-based citizens as a reference category to allow for a direct comparison between engaged and duty-based citizenship norms. Given the fact that the country-level variables are closely related, they could not be included simultaneously in the analysis, forcing us to construct three different models for every citizenship type. It also has to be noted that this regression analysis remains limited to 34 countries because not all data were
available for the small countries or territories of Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Malta and Liechtenstein.

From a theoretical perspective, the most relevant comparison is the direct comparison between engaged and duty-based citizenship norms. When we first investigate the individual level determinants (Appendix Table A3), it is obvious that most expectations are confirmed. Engaged citizenship norms are more likely to be found among girls, and among respondents where the high number of books at home indicates a higher socio-economic status. Media-use too contributes to the developed of engaged citizenship norms. Those adhering to engaged norms, are characterized by higher levels of generalized trust, but they have less trust in political institutions. This suggests that engaged citizens indeed adopt a more critical outlook toward the functioning of political institutions, which is in line with what we would expect based on the literature.

If we subsequently turn to the country-level variables, results are counter-intuitive. In fact, engaged citizenship norms are less likely to be found in richer countries and in stable democracies, as both the years of stable democracy and the GDP/capita have a significantly negative effect. To express it differently: while in the literature it is expected that in highly-developed stable democracies engaged citizenship norms will prevail, the results of our analysis suggest that in fact duty-based citizenship concepts are predominant. Given space restrictions, we can only briefly mention some result on the other types. It is clear that the subject citizenship concept is characterized by a lack of political interest and political efficacy. Respectful citizens, on the other hand are strongly interested and this type is more prevalent in recent democracies. The all-around citizens, finally, have high levels of trust in political institutions, while this norm too is concentrated in recent democracies. So while on the individual level the expectations about the prevalence and the distribution of these engaged norms are largely confirmed, we find the opposite
pattern at the country level: duty-based citizenship norms seem to prevail in highly developed and stable democracies.

**Discussion**

This article contributes to the theoretical debate on citizenship norms in three main ways, which we elaborate upon in this discussion. First, the concepts of duty-based and engaged citizenship are identified in a large group of diverse countries. The findings also show, however, that these two citizenship concepts do not cover the full range of normative concepts that respondents actually hold. Finally, while the individual-level determinants of engaged and duty-based citizenship norms generally follow theoretical expectations in the literature, the country-level findings diverge in several ways from theoretical expectations.

The findings document our use of latent class analysis to ascertain that there are indeed distinct groups of respondents who express either engaged or duty-based citizenship norms. While Dalton (2008) proposed this distinction based on a factor analysis in a single country (the US) and confirmed it with a select group of advanced democracies (Dalton 2007), we can now support the cross-national validity of the existence of these citizenship norms based on a latent class analysis of respondents in 38 countries. Both groups can be clearly distinguished since they are opposed on a number of vital indicators of good citizenship. Engaged citizens score very high on the importance of protecting human rights, but they downplay the importance of traditionally duty-based behaviors like voting and political party involvement. Engaged citizens also strongly emphasize the importance of contributing to the local community. For the duty-based citizens, however, we find opposite normative emphases.
The current analysis therefore clearly lends comparative data support for the claim put forward by Dalton and other authors that engaged and duty-based citizenship norms are prevalent in a variety of contemporary democracies. This finding has important implications for future participation patterns of today’s youth. If the Dalton thesis about generational replacement of duty-based citizenship norms by engaged citizenship norms will prove to be correct in future research, a decline in duty-based norms could indeed explain emerging trends which show that contemporary young age cohorts are characterized by lower voter turnout figures in comparison to their counterparts a generation ago. Simultaneously, however, we can expect that younger age groups will be more inclined to participate in various forms of non-institutionalized participation.

An important caveat to be added to Dalton’s thesis, however, based on the findings in this article, is that the distinction between duty-based and engaged citizenship tells only part of the story. While the proportion of citizens who adhere to these two types of citizenship norms is large enough to have the potential for real-life impact on political outcomes such as environmental action and electoral turnout, it has to be noted that only about half of all respondents belong to these two groups, while the other half adhere to other citizenship norms. Indeed, there is a substantial group of respondents that adheres to what we might call rather traditional citizenship norms that invoke respect for authorities or the duty to obey the law. In line with the reasoning developed by Almond and Verba (1963), our findings suggest that traditional citizenship norms will not simply disappear, but rather continue to linger on in populations along with more recent engaged norms.

For the determinants of citizenship norms, it is important to distinguish individual level and country level findings. The individual-level findings generally confirmed expectations in the literature that girls and high-status respondents are indeed more likely to adhere to engaged
citizenship norms. On the country-level, however, the findings did not support the argument made by authors such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) that self-expressive values and corresponding citizenship norms will develop mostly in advanced societies and democracies. Even the opposite phenomenon occurred as adolescents in established democracies are more supportive of duty-based citizenship norms.

These findings clearly show that individual level and country level explanations should not be confounded in the study of citizenship norms, even though much of the conventional wisdom on this topic has been based on studies of a single country or region. Although the individual-level analysis shows that the high status respondents are apparently the first to support engaged citizenship norms, this does not mean that these norms are also more prevalent in high income countries. A plausible explanation for this finding is that the citizens in advanced democracies may take democratic stability more easily for granted. In the more recent democracies, on the other hand, being engaged oneself is clearly something which is more on the minds of young citizens. As we have seen, engaged citizenship norms are most prevalent in the more recent democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, where protecting the environment and human rights may be perceived as particularly salient issues. So obviously a linear development model, which would imply that the highest prevalence of these norms can be found in the most advanced democracies (and typically in this literature these are the Scandinavian countries), is not supported by our data.

To consider the implications of these findings for the future political behavior of contemporary youth, it is worth emphasizing that the duty-based and engaged citizenship norms identified in this research differ from each other most notably with regard to the importance attached to voting and to defending human rights and the environment, or being active in the local community. To a large extent, this corresponds to the distinction between institutionalized and
non-institutionalized forms of political participation. In light of research on the habitual development of political behavior over the life-cycle (Plutzer, 2002), the fact that we already find clearly distinct citizenship norms among 14-year-olds suggests that this group of citizens will develop a preference for either institutionalized forms of engagement (e.g., voting) or non-institutionalized forms (e.g., environmental activism). The engaged citizenship norm might indeed be associated with a reduced willingness to participate in elections as Wattenberg (2012) has pointed out. But there is an equally strong positive association with protecting the environment and human rights, and with helping others in the local community. Clearly, the ‘good citizens’ of the next generation do not intend to abandon civic engagement, but apparently they intend to relate to the political system in their own distinct manner.
References


### Table 1. Indicators of Good Citizenship Used in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Considered Important (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always obeying the law</td>
<td>obey</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking part in activities to protect the environment</td>
<td>envir</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking part in activities promoting human rights</td>
<td>rights</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting in every national election</td>
<td>vote</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working hard</td>
<td>work</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in activities to benefit people in the <em>local community</em></td>
<td>local</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning about the country's history</td>
<td>history</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing respect for government representatives</td>
<td>respect</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following political issues through the newspaper, radio, TV, or internet</td>
<td>news</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust</td>
<td>protest</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging in political discussions</td>
<td>discuss</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining a political party</td>
<td>party</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) 2009. N=130,769 (includes only cases which had values for all citizenship norms indicators).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>BIC(LL)</th>
<th>$L^2$</th>
<th>% change $L^2$</th>
<th>Class.Err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Class</td>
<td>1627265</td>
<td>323019</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Class</td>
<td>1507810</td>
<td>202975</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Class</td>
<td>1479223</td>
<td>173799</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-Class</td>
<td>1466833</td>
<td>160820</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Class</td>
<td>1455668</td>
<td>149066</td>
<td><strong>-0.54</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.20</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Class</td>
<td>1446473</td>
<td>139282</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Class</td>
<td>1439824</td>
<td>132043.8</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) 2009 (N=130,769). BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; $L^2$=likelihood ratio chi-square statistics. LCA findings using Latent Gold 4.5 software. Entries are test statistics for latent class models identifying one and more clusters of respondents, based on 12 indicators of citizenship norms with ‘country’ as a covariate.
Figure 1. Citizenship Norms: Engaged and Duty-based
Legend: Citizenship norm, followed by percentage of the population adhering to this norm

Note: Latent Class Analysis conditional probabilities for two of the five latent classes identified in the five-class model (together constituting 45% of the research population). The y-axis plots the conditional probabilities that members of a latent class will consider the indicators on the x-axis to be important elements of good citizenship. Indicators on the x-axis are organized from left to right by decreasing means, and the sample mean is listed beneath the x-axis labels in parentheses.
Figure 2. Citizenship Norms: All-around, Respectful and Subject
Legend: Citizenship norm, followed by percentage of the population adhering to this norm

Note: Latent Class Analysis conditional probabilities for the remaining three latent classes identified in the five-class model.